Historical Survey of Multi-Story Building Collapses Due to Fire
Beitel, J. J., Hughes Associates, Inc
Iwankiw, N. R., Hughes Associates, Inc.
This project was conducted for the National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST) under Contact Number NA1341-02-W-0686. It was commissioned to assess the
needs and existing capabilities for full-scale fire resistance testing of structural
connections under the direction of NIST Program Manager, William Grosshandler. The
Scope of Work consisted of three separate Tasks, one of which was to conduct a survey
of historical information on fire occurrences in multi-story buildings, which resulted in
full or partial structural collapse. The results of this individual Task are the subject of
this paper.
Either partial or total failure of the structural framing, members, and/or connections was
considered to have met the definition of “collapse.” A multi-story building was defined
to consist of 4 or more stories.
The historical search for catastrophic multi-story fires included incidents dating
back to the 1950’s, or earlier, with emphasis on those which occurred in North America.
In addition, similar events that occurred throughout the world were also solicited and
captured as available. The search for this data was conducted using three principal
sources: news databases, published literature, and direct inquiries to key individuals and
organizations. Information sought included:
• Date and location of fire;
• Type of building, its occupancy use, construction type, number of stories, etc.;
• Cause and extent of the fire event;
• Description of the structural collapse;
• Additional information concerning the event, as available; and
• Reference for the fire event information to include literature citations, etc.
To supplement the broad and extensive news and literature searches, direct
contacts were made with individuals and organizations that were expected to have
authoritative information on historical fire-induced collapses. The list of domestic and
international professional organizations, companies, and/or governmental agencies
contacted included:
American Concrete Institute (ACI)
American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC)
American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI)
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
Arbed Steel
British Constructional Steel Association (BCSA)
Canadian Institute of Steel Construction (CISC)
Construction Technology Laboratory (CTL)
Corus-British Steel
CTICM, France
Disaster Prevention Institute, Kyoto University, Japan
Factory Mutual Research Corporation (FMRC)
Institute for Business and Home Safety
International Association For Fire Safety Science (IAFSS)
Isolatek International
Mexican Institute of Steel Construction (IMCA)
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
National Institute for Fire and Research (Japan)
National Research Council of Canada (NRCC)
Nucor-Yamato Steel Corp.
Society for Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE)
Victoria University of Technology, Australia
In addition, a survey request for information was sent to several prominent engineers and
consulting firms.
In order to have been included in this incident tabulation, fire needed to have been judged
the proximate cause for the building collapse (partial or total). Hence, any collapses due
primarily to explosions, impacts, earthquakes, wind, and other construction or design
factors were beyond the scope of this survey, even if fires had developed during the
course of these events. It was equally difficult to evaluate the separate effects of the
many fires in buildings that are known to have occurred after major earthquakes.
Survey Results
In summary, a total of 22 cases from 1970-2002 are presented in Table 1, with 15 from
the US and two from Canada. The number of fire-induced collapse events can be
categorized by building construction material as follows:
• Concrete: 7
• Structural steel: 6
• Brick/masonry: 5
• Unknown: 2
• Wood: 2
Three of these events were from the 1970’s, three were from the 1980’s, four
were from the 1990’s, and twelve occurred in 2000 and beyond. This temporal
distribution was skewed towards more recent occurrences both due to the magnitude of
the WTC collapses (4 collapse events) and the enhanced availability of computerized
news media data.
The collapse distribution by building story height was as follows:
• 4-8 stories 13
• 9-20 3
• 21 or more 6
Almost 60% of the cases occurred in the 4-8 story building height range, with the
remainder affecting much taller buildings. Six collapses occurred in buildings over 20
stories, with three of these occurring at the World Trace Center complex (WTC 1,WTC 2
and WTC 7).
At least four of these fire-induced collapses occurred during construction or
renovations, when the usual architectural, structural and fire protection functions were
incomplete or temporarily disrupted. Partial collapses (14 events) were the most frequent
occurrences, and the three World Trade Center complete collapses dominated the full
collapse event total of eight cases. Office and residential were the primary occupancy
types in these 20 buildings, as would be expected in multi-story construction. The
occupancy distribution is as follows:
• Office: 9
• Residential: 8
• Commercial: 3
• Combined commercial/residential: 2
The events related to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center (WTC) complex in New York were the dominant fire and collapse events of this
survey (represented as 4 separate incidents). The extent of the tragedy and devastation on
this day were unprecedented. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
report (FEMA 403) published in May, 2002, is a notable reference that provides an
excellent overview of the day’s chronology and each of the directly affected structural
steel buildings (WTC 1, WTC 2, WTC 5, WTC 7). On September 11, 2001 the 5-story
Pentagon building in Washington, DC, was also struck by a hijacked aircraft, resulting in
extensive damage and fire. The Pentagon was constructed between 1941 and 1943 of
hardened, cast-in-place reinforced concrete. The Pentagon Building Performance Report
was released in February, 2003 by ASCE/SEI.
Among the other prior fire events of interest, Sao Paulo experienced one of the
biggest fires in Brazil on May 21, 1987, which precipitated a substantial partial collapse
of the central core of the CESP Building 2, see Figure 1. This was a 21-story office
building, headquarters of the Sao Paulo Power Company (CESP). Buildings 1 and 2 of
this office complex were both constructed of reinforced concrete framing, with ribbed
slab floors.
Figure 1 CESP 2 Core Collapse in Sao Paulo, Brazil
A fire-initiated collapse of a 6-story reinforced concrete textile factory occurred in
Alexandria, Egypt on July 19, 2000 (Reuters News, 2000; BBC News, 2000). The fire
started in the storage room at the ground floor. Fire extinguishers were non-functional,
and the fire spread quickly before firefighters arrived. Approximately nine hours after
the start of the fire, when the blaze seemingly was under control and subsiding, the
building suddenly collapsed, killing 27 people. Figure 2 shows a photograph of this
Figure 2 Collapsed Textile Factory in Alexandria, Egypt
Among the general observations from this survey of fire-induced collapses of
multi-story buildings was that while they are relatively few in number, the consequences
were significant, and could have been even worse in terms of human fatalities and
economic losses. The fire risk appeared to be slightly higher during building construction
and renovation work. Of the 17 fire incidents in the US and Canada, only the Santana
Row development collapse in San Jose, CA, occurred outside the northeastern quadrant
of North American (North and East of Missouri).
This data demonstrated that buildings of all types of construction and
occupancies, in North America, and abroad, are susceptible to fire-induced collapse,
particularly older buildings. The annual fire occurrences in the US, according to Hall,
(2001), exceeded 10,000 in buildings that were 7-stories or taller. Those that were
undergoing repairs or renovations appeared to further increase the fire and collapse risk.
If the fire could not be quickly contained and suppressed by sprinklers, firefighters, or
other fire protection measures, it posed a serious life safety hazard for any of the building
occupants present. Continued fire spread can lead to a partial or total collapse in a multistory
building, compounding occupant losses, as in some of the cases described above.
Difficulties were encountered during this survey in readily identifying news, and other
credible sources, of historical and technical information on the fire-induced collapses of
buildings. The potential data sources were fragmented, often incomplete, and sometimes
conflicting. This lack of data and information significantly hampered the development of
a more complete understanding of the magnitude and nature of fire-induced collapse. A
centralized reliable body of catalogued information on fire-induced building collapses is
To complement the fire-induced collapse cases described previously, a summary of
selected major recent fires in high-rises that did not suffer collapse, but did incur
significant structural fire damage, are presented in Table 2. The significance of the
selected 7 major fire events in Table 2 was that even though there was no associated
structural collapse, numerous casualties had occurred in some cases (MGM Grand Hotel,
Las Vegas, 1980 and the Joelma Building, Sao Paulo, 1972 fires), and there was
generally significant fire damage and enormous property loss in every instance.
Just as for other natural hazards (wind or earthquake), the time, location, and
characteristics of the fire are critical in determining the resulting human and property
losses. The total deaths reported for the events in Table 1 were over 3,000. Over 2,800
occurred in the recent 2001 collapses of WTC 1 and WTC 2.
A fire-induced collapse in a multi-story building can be classified as a low
frequency, high-consequence event. Modern society draws much attention to these and
attempts to prevent them, much as it does for earthquakes and windstorms. Given that
there can be no guarantee that a fire will not occur in a given building, or that it will be
successfully contained and suppressed, the fire resistance of the building structure must
be duly assessed in its design in order to avoid local and progressive collapses. Since
several of these documented cases demonstrated various member and structural
connection failures, a better understanding of the response of various building
connections to fire is needed. The effects of elevated temperatures on the strength of
connectors themselves and on their ductility, as well as how thermal expansion of
adjacent heated members affects the stress redistribution in a floor and framing subassemblage
through its connections, are important issues yet to be resolved for all
building materials. Connections are generally recognized as the critical link in the
collapse vulnerability of all structural framing systems, whether or not fire is involved.
Table 1 Summary of Multi-Story Building Fires With Collapses
(4 or more stories)
Building Name Location Type of Construction, Material, and Fire
# Of Floors and
Date, Approximate Time of Collapse, and
Nature and Extent of Collapse
(Partial or Total)
Santana Row, Bldgs.
San Jose, CA,
Wood frame, still under construction, fire
protection and sprinklers not
August 19, 2002
Chui; Gathright
Total collapse and destruction
Apartment block St. Petersburg,
Concrete l9 June 3, 2002, starting at 1 hour fire duration
Residential BBC News Online
Jackson Street
Hamilton, Ontario
Concrete 21
February 8, 2002,
Partial collapse of concrete floorceilings

WTC 7 New York, NY,
Steel moment frame with composite steel
beam and deck floors; fire resistive with
Sept. 11, 2001
FEMA 403
WTC 2 New York, NY,
Structural steel tube lateral system with
composite floor truss system; fire resistive
with retrofitted sprinklers
Sept. 11, 2001, after 1 hour of fire
following jet impact and damage
FEMA 403
WTC 1 New York, NY,
Structural steel tube lateral system with
composite floor truss system; fire resistive
with retrofitted sprinklers
Sept. 11, 2001, after 1.5 hours of fire
following jet impact and damage
FEMA 403
WTC 5 New York, NY,
Steel moment frame with composite steel
beam and deck floors; fire resistive with
Sept. 11, 2001, unknown time, fire burned
uncontrolled for more than 8 hours
FEMA 403
Partial collapse of 4 stories and 2
Pentagon Washington, DC,
Reinforced Concrete 5
Sept. 11, 2001, 30 minutes after jet impact
Official report release pending
Partial collapses of floors and
Faces Nightclub and
Memories Lounge Bar
Unknown 4
February 27, 2001, after 2 hours
Textile Factory Alexandria, Egypt Reinforced Concrete. no sprinklers 6
July 21, 2000, after 9 hours of fire
Reuters News
Building Name Location Type of Construction, Material, and Fire
# Of Floors and
Date, Approximate Time of Collapse, and
Nature and Extent of Collapse
(Partial or Total)
Apartment in
Pittsburgh, PA,
Wood 6 May 7, 2000, few hours after fire started
Residential News
Back wall fell, initiating
Commercial complex
(near Chestnut Hill
Newton, MA,
Brick/masonry 4
February 9, 2000,
after slightly more than a 1 hour fire
Collapse started at upper story and
Effingham Plaza
Nursing Home
Portsmouth, VA,
Unknown Multi-story April 6, 1998, fire started on top floor
Residential News
Roof collapsed in places
Coeur de Royale
I-270 and Olive Blvd.
Creve Coeur, MO,
Unknown 4
August 25, 1994
Partial collapses of roofs
Apartments, Brooke
Ave and 138th St.
Bronx, NY, USA Brick 5
April 5, 1994
Rear of the building collapsed.
Central Square Apt.
Massachusetts Ave.
and Douglas St.
Cambridge, MA,
Brick 8
October 1, 1993
Collapse of several floors
CESP, Sede 2 Sao Paulo, Brazil Reinforced concrete frame, with ribbed slabs;
no sprinklers
May 21, 1987, after 2 hour fire
Berto and Tomina
Partial, full height interior core
Alexis Nihon Plaza Montreal, Canada Steel frame with composite steel beam and
deck floors; fire resistive without sprinklers
Oct. 26, 1986, after 5 hour fire, which then
continued for 13 hours
Isner, NFPA Fire Investigation Report
Partial 11th floor collapse
Katrantzos Sport
Department Store
Athens, Greece Reinforced concrete 8
Dec. 19,1980
Partial collapses of 5-8th floor,
together with various other
members, during a 2-3 hour fire
Military Personnel
Record Center
Overland, MO,
Reinforced concrete, without expansion
joints, no sprinklers above 2nd floor
July 12, 1973
1974 Fire Journal
Roof and supporting columns
partially collapsed 12 hours after
fire began
Hotel Vendome Boston, MA, USA Masonry with cast iron 5-6
June 17, 1972, after almost a 3 hour fire
All five floors of a 40 by 45 ft
section collapsed
One New York Plaza New York, NY,
Steel framing with reinforced concrete core,
fire resistive with no sprinklers.
August 5, 1970
Connection bolts sheared during
fire, causing several steel filler
beams on the 33-34th floors to fall
and rest on the bottom flanges of
their supporting girders.
Table 2 Selected Multi-Story Building Fires With No Collapses
(4 or more stories)
Location Type of Construction,
Material, and Fire
# Of Floors
and Occupancy
Date of Fire
Incident, and
Nature and Extent of Fire
One Meridian
Philadelphia, PA, USA Steel frame with composite
steel beam and deck floors;
fire resistive, but sprinklers
not operational (retrofit in
Feb. 23-24, 1991
Klem, 1991
Started Saturday and burned for
a total of 18 hours, causing
significant structural damage to
9 floors
Churchill Plaza,
Basingstoke, UK
Steel frame with composite
floor beams; fire resistive, but
no sprinklers
Newman, et al., 200
Fire burnout of 8th to10th floors
Phase 8
London, UK Steel composite trusses and
beams; mostly not fire
protected and without
Newman, et al., 200
During construction, 4.5 hour
fire duration and temperatures
reached 1000 ºC
First Interstate
Los Angeles, CA, USA Steel frame with composite
steel beam and deck floors;
fire resistive; sprinklers not
May 4, 1988
Klem, 1988
Lasted for about 3.5 hours,
causing major damage to four
MGM Grand
Las Vegas, Nevada, USA Mixed, no sprinklers 26
Resort and
Nov. 21, 1980
Misc. News &
Clark County Report
Burned for hours
Sao Paulo, Brazil Reinforced concrete 31
Feb. 24, 1972
Hall, 2001
Spalling of exterior walls,
joists, and columns, exposing
Sao Paulo, Brazil Reinforced Concrete 25
Feb. 1, 1974
Hall, 2001
Spalling of exterior walls

The Federalist 68

The Mode of Electing the President

Hamilton From the New York Packet. Friday, March 14, 1788.

To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded.[1] I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.

It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.

It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of several, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of one who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.

Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one querter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.

Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.

The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: “For forms of government let fools contest That which is best administered is best,” yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.

The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter.

The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.